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ABSTRACT
This article examines child custody and visitation cases in which
courts operate under the assumption that parents who live openly
as sexual minorities will harm their children. Based on this assump-
tion, courts frequently impose restrictions on parents, requiring them
to live closeted lives in order to have access to their children. Part I
of this article introduces the concept of the judicially imposed closet
as courts have applied it through several custody and visitation cases.
Part II examines social science research concerning the psychologi-
cal impact of "family secrets" on parents and children as well as re-
search on sexual minority parenting. This research does not support
the assumption of custody and visitation courts that it is harmful to
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children when their parents live openly as sexual minorities. Part
III analyzes how, in cases involving sexual minority parenting, such
as same-gender marriage, foster care, and adoption, the underlying
assumption is that sexual minority parents who are open about their
sexual orientation are raising happy, healthy, and well-adjusted
children. Part IV then compares adoption cases with child custody
and visitation cases examining how the same set of facts in an
adoption case would be used against a sexual minority parent in a
custody or visitation case. Finally, Part V argues that if courts were
to treat sexual orientation as a neutral factor, as they do in most of
the adoption cases involving sexual minority parents, then the courts
could properly focus on assessing each parent's child-raising abilities,
investigating the nature of the parent-child relationship, and preserv-
ing the emotional attachment of the children to their parents. It is
these factors, not a parent's sexual orientation, that are relevant to
determining the true best interests of the children in custody and
visitation disputes.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the judicial assumption present in child
custody and visitation' cases that parents who live openly as sexual
minorities2 will harm their children and how this assumption results
in courts judicially imposing closeted lives on sexual minority parents
and their children. In these cases, the heterosexual parent will raise
the issue of sexual orientation, generally coupled with a request for
severe restrictions imposed on the sexual minority parent's exercise
of visitation, in an attempt to obtain custody of the child.3 Many of
the earlier cases, decided in the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in courts
finding that being a sexual minority rendered a parent per se unfit to
1. Most jurisdictions have replaced the terms "custody" and "visitation" with more
modern terms, such as "primary residential parent" and "exercising parenting time."
These former two terms, however, are used in this article because they easily distin-
guish the primary residential parent, who was previously described as having "custody,"
from the parent who is not the primary residential parent, formerly referred to as the
parent with "visitation rights." In addition, most of the references cited in this article
use the terms "custody" and "visitation."
2. In this article, the term "sexual minority" refers to persons who are not hetero-
sexual, such as lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, omnisexuals, and transgendered and inter-
sex individuals. See Mark Blasius, Sexual Identities, Queer Politics, and the Status of
Knowledge, in SEXUAL IDENTITIES AND QUEER POLITICS 1, 4 (Mark Blasius ed., 2001).
3. See, e.g., Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Ala. 1998) (upholding the trial
court's decision to change custody to the father after the mother began living openly
with her lesbian partner); Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (affirming
the trial court's restriction of the mother's visitation "in order to limit the children's
exposure to their mother's lesbian lifestyle').
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have custody or unrestricted visitation.4 The underlying assumption
in these earlier custody and visitation cases was that children are
harmed by the parent's sexual orientation.5 Some of the more recent
cases, however, have adopted the "nexus" approach; these cases re-
quire evidence that there is some connection, or nexus, between the
parent's sexual orientation and a detrimental impact on the child.6
Although later cases appear less restrictive than the earlier cases,
this article more closely examines the facts in these later cases, reveal-
ing that many courts continue to disapprove of parents living openly
as sexual minorities. Even appellate cases that decide in favor of the
sexual minority parent do so because the parent is being discreet,'
the parent does not share a bedroom with his or her partner,' or the
parent does not express affection toward his or her partner or hug
or kiss the partner in the presence of the children.9 On the other hand,
parents who explain their sexual orientation to their children, kiss
or hug their partners in front of their children, or attend gay-related
events or activities, have a difficult time maintaining custody or
having unrestricted visitation with their children. 10 These judicial
holdings may result in sexual minority parents living in judicially
imposed closets, even in their own homes, to maintain unrestricted
contact with their children, reaffirming the earlier cases' assump-
tion that parents harm their children by being open about their
sexual orientation.
4. See Irish v. Irish, 360 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
"[b]ased on the mores of our society, we do not consider the continued presence of the
[lesbian] lover of the children's mother as an element of the children's custodial environ-
ment which must be preserved and protected"); see also Roe v. Roe 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
(Va. 1985) (holding that "[tihe father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral
and illicit [homosexual] relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as
a matter of law").
5. See, e.g., Roe, 324 S.E. 2d at 694.
6. E.g., McGriffv. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004) ("Only when there is a
nexus between harm to the child and a parent's homosexuality, can that parent's sexual
orientation be a factor in determining custody of a child."); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d
164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("There must be a nexus between harm to the child and the
parent's homosexuality.").
7. See Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699,700-01 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); see also McKay
v. Johnson, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1996) (mother
agreed not to take the children to any gay rights events in the future when the father
sought to restrict the mother's visitation).
8. See In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
9. See Berry v. Berry, No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847, at *4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. May 31, 2005); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 86-87 (Tenn. 2001).
10. See S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 167; Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995);
Exparte J.MF., 730 So.2d at 1195-96; Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173,
at *1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1998); McGriff, 99 P.3d at 119, 123; see also Susan M.
Moss, Note, McGriff v. McGriff" Consideration of a Parent's Sexual Orientation in Child
Custody Disputes, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 593, 603-05 (2005).
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This article applies existing research concerning the psychologi-
cal impact of "family secrets" on parents and children to this judicial
action, which requires parents to keep parts of their lives secret to
maintain custody or visitation rights. According to current social
science research, keeping secrets from children and, as a result, living
inauthentic lives, has negative consequences for both the parents
and their children, creating distance, mistrust, and anxiety." Thus,
court decisions that order or expect parents to live in the closet harm
the children and are not in their best interests. In addition, the re-
search concerning children raised by openly gay parents demonstrates
that these children adjust as well and are as psychologically healthy
as children raised by heterosexual parents. 2
This article obseryes that in other cases involving sexual
minority parenting, such as same-gender marriage,13 foster care, and
adoption, the majority of courts accept the results of the research
about sexual minority parents. 4 The underlying assumption in these
cases is that sexual minority parents, who are open about their sexual
orientation and fully integrated into society as sexual minority indi-
viduals, are raising happy, healthy, and well-adjusted children." In
particular, the adoption cases, in which the courts examine the specific
facts of the case to determine whether adoption is in the best inter-
est of the child, view the sexual orientation of the parents in neutral
terms, along with other facts describing the adoptive parents. 6 The
adoption courts discuss, with approval, how the adoptive parents'
families, employers, co-workers, and faith communities support them
as parents. 7 In other words, the underlying reasoning used in court
decisions regarding adoption cases is that a court will not grant or
reject adoption petitions of openly gay parents solely because of the
parents' lifestyle, rather, the courts will grant adoptions in accor-
dance with the best interests of the child.'8 This reasoning contra-
dicts the courts' opposite assumption in the custody and visitation
cases that openly gay parents cannot provide stable and nurturing
home environments. 19
11. See EVAN IMBER-BLACK, THE SECRET LIFE OF FAMIuES: TRUTH-TELLING, PRIVACY,
AND RECONCILIATION IN A TELL-ALL SOCIETY 35-36 (1998).
12. See LESLIE COOPER & PAUL CATES, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., Too
HIGHA PRICE: THE CASEAGAINSTRESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 25-73 (2d. ed. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset upload_ file953_24098.pdf (summarizing studies
examining the psychological health of children in homes with openly gay minorities).
13. This article uses the term "same-gender" instead of "same-sex."
14. See infra Part III for a discussion of cases involving sexual minority parents.
15. See id.
16. See infra Part III, § C.
17. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995).
18. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part I.
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This article next compares adoption cases with custody and visi-
tation cases. This comparison demonstrates how the same set of facts
in an adoption case would be used against a sexual minority parent
in a custody or visitation case.2° This section also explores some of
the reasons why courts treat these cases differently.21
In conclusion, this article discusses how the underlying assump-
tion and findings in the marriage, foster care, and adoption cases -
that sexual minority parents who are open about their sexual
orientation are raising happy, healthy, well-adjusted children -
should be applied to child custody and visitation cases. In accepting
this underlying assumption, the issue of a parent's sexual orienta-
tion should become a neutral factor, as it is in the adoption cases.
Courts could then focus on assessing each parent's child-raising
skills and preserving the emotional attachment of the children to
their parents, as in any other child custody or visitation dispute.
I. CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES INVOLVING SEXUAL MINORITY
PARENTS
Prior to 2000 most courts strongly disapproved of a sexual minor-
ity parent attaining custody or unrestricted visitation of a child when
there was a custody or visitation dispute with a heterosexual parent.22
Some earlier cases,23 using what is known as the per se analysis,
found that a parent's homosexuality rendered the parent an unfit and
improper custodian of the child as a matter of law.24 In other cases,
the courts conditioned a parent's custody or visitation on numerous
restrictions, based on a presumption that knowledge of or exposure
to the parent's homosexuality would harm the child.2"An earlier Ohio case highlights the restrictions courts placed on
gay parents. 2' The Ohio appeals court held that the trial court erred
in not establishing proper protections against the father revealing to
20. See infra Part III.
21. See id.
22. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Restrictions on Parent's Child Visitation Rights
Based on Parent's Sexual Conduct, 99 A.L.R. 5TH 475, 504-06 (2002); Elizabeth Trainor,
Annotation, Custodial Parent's Homosexual or Lesbian Relationship with Third Person
as Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 65 A.L.R. 5th 591, 601-12 (1999);
Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, InitialAward or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual
or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R. 5th 591, 600-16 (1998).
23. Interestingly, all of these earlier cases were decided after the American Psychiatric
Association removed homosexuality as a diagnosable mental disorder in 1973. See Kathryn
Kendell, The Custody Challenge: Debunking Myths About Lesbian and Gay Parents and
Their Children, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1997, at 20, 21.
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
25. See Miller, supra note 22, at 504-06 for a list of cases that support this rationale.
26. Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
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his children that he was a homosexual.2" The court's reasoning for
imposing this restriction was that "the state has a substantial in-
terest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behavior which
threatens the social fabric, and in endeavoring to protect minors
from being influenced by those who advocate homosexual lifestyles."2
The appellate court stated that if the trial court was unable to devise
adequate protections from the children discovering their father's
homosexuality, then the trial court should terminate all contact be-
tween the father and the children "until the children attain such an
age that they will not be harmed or influenced by learning of their
father's homosexuality."29 The court believed this restriction was
necessary because the father had testified that if his children were
to ask him directly whether he was homosexual he could not "lie to
[his] children."3
Earlier cases have also restrained the parent who is exercising
custody or visitation from having the child in the presence of a same-
gender partner,31 in the presence of other gay or lesbian individuals,32
or in the presence of individuals believed to be gay or lesbian." Addi-
tionally, other courts have prevented a gay parent from taking the
child to any functions that support gay persons or gay causes 34 or
from taking the child to a gay-supportive church.3" For example, in
1989 the Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court order in
which "neither the [father's] present lover nor any other male with
whom the [father] may be residing shall be in the child's presence
or in the [father's] home during such visits." 6 The appellate court
held that these restrictions were insufficient and "found that unres-
tricted visitation by the father would endanger the child's mental
health and emotional development. It is further determined that visi-
tation by the father must be supervised visitation in the presence
of a responsible adult."37 A logical inference from the appellate court's
choice of words is that homosexuals are not "responsible" adults.
The practical effect of the courts's restrictions in these cases is
that the sexual minority parents must live "in the closet" when the
parent and child are together. When parents attempt to counter
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1070.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1069.
31. E.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985); Roberts, 489 N.E.2d at 1070.
32. See In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
33. See Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
34. See Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
35. See id. at 736; J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
36. J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 786-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
37. Id. at 794 (citations omitted).
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the judicially imposed closet with constitutional arguments or psy-
chological studies, several courts have not hesitated to reject these
arguments as lacking credibility. The Missouri Court of Appeals
observed that:
Wife, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.), cite
articles that indicate there are no significant differences among
heterosexual parents and homosexual divorced parents and their
children. Of course, the trial court has the authority to find the
evidence presented not credible.
Wife and lover show affection toward one another in front of the
children. They sleep together in the same bed.... All of these
factors present an unhealthy environment for minor children.
Such conduct can never be kept private enough to be a neutral
factor in the development of a child's values and character. We
will not ignore such conduct by a parent which may have an effect
on the children's moral development.
This analysis is sufficient to answer the aspects of Wife's and
A.C.L.U.'s constitutional arguments.
In the few cases in our state dealing directly with the problem
of a homosexual parent seeking primary custody, all courts have
awarded custody to the non-homosexual parent, and restricted
the homosexual parent's visitation rights, again relying on the
impact upon the child. We are not presuming that Wife is an un-
caring mother. The environment, however, that she would choose
to rear her children in is unhealthy for their growth. She has
chosen not to make her sexual preference private but invites
acknowledgment and imposes her preference upon her children
and her community. The purpose of restricting visitation is to
prevent extreme exposure of the situation to the minor children.
We are not forbidding Wife from being a homosexual, from having
a lesbian relationship, or from attending gay activities or overt
homosexual outings. We are restricting her from exposing these
elements of her "alternative life style" to her minor children.38
38. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
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Similarly, in a 1995 Wyoming case, the mother and father be-
came embroiled in a visitation dispute when the mother decided to
live openly with her partner.39
Initially, Pamela's custody of her children was predicated
upon her disavowal of homosexuality. When it became clear that
this was not the case, she voluntarily relinquished custody of the
children to Dean in exchange for liberal visitation privileges.
Pamela's capitulation did not quell the righteous fires burning
within Dean and Christine, who felt compelled to instruct the chil-
dren that Pamela had abandoned them for the affections of another
woman, embracing a lifestyle which was a sin and abomination.
Pamela, of course, understood that Dean's aversion to lesbi-
anism antedated his union with Christine. Pamela, on her part,
insisted upon familiarizing the children with every aspect of her
newfound existence, "snuggling" with the children and her com-
panion, enlisting the participation of the children in a gay/lesbian
rights parade and her "commitment" ceremony."0
Consequently, the court considered the mother's actions of snug-
gling with the children and her partner, taking the children to a gay
rights parade, and having the children involved in her commitment
ceremony, which the appellate court characterized as a "compulsion
to relentlessly expose the children to every aspect of her relation-
ship," as blameworthy as the father's demonization of the mother.41
The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that although the trial court
indulged an essentially personal view in derogation of Pamela's life-
style, nonetheless, "[i]t was reasonable for the district court to con-
clude that limiting Pamela's visitation with the children would limit
the damage done by mutual parental insistence upon use of the chil-
dren as weapons in an acrimonious contest between lifestyles."" Based
on this rationale, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
severe limitations on the mother's visitation.43 In conclusion, the court
stated that the trial court's "judgment is not affirmed because of
Dean and Christine's insistence upon their 'values' so much as it is
in spite of that behavior. The damage their contest with Pamela has
done to these children may already be irreparable."" The dissent
39. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
40. Id. at 951.
41. Id. at 949.
42. Id. at 952. The dissent, however, found the majority's reasoning "strange and un-
acceptable," noting that all custody and visitation cases involve acrimonious contests. Id.
at 954 (Golden, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 953.
44. Id.
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was incredulous at the majority's decision, noting that "[t]he record
quite clearly reveals that the father and Christine worked long and
hard at alienating these children from their mother. They should
have been held in contempt for what they have done; instead, they
are ... rewarded for their outrageous behavior."45
In a 1998 Alabama case, a father sought a change in child cus-
tody, not because the mother was a lesbian, but because the mother
and her partner "were not conducting a discreet affair in the guise
of 'roommates' but were, instead, presenting themselves openly to
the child as affectionate 'life partners' with a relationship similar
to the father and the stepmother."46 The trial court determined that
the mother should lose custody of her daughter and not be allowed
to have her partner present during visitation even though it was the
"unanimous opinion of all the psychologists that the child was pretty,
well-groomed, intelligent, energetic, healthy, and generally happy."47
Furthermore, the child's therapist testified that "a change in custody
would have a substantial detrimental effect on the child, perhaps caus-
ing her to have immediate and/or long-term behavior problems, school
problems, or depression."48
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
to change custody to the father, finding that the father's subsequent
marriage, together with the mother's decision to no longer live in a
closeted relationship, provided sufficient evidence that "a change in
custody would materially promote the child's best interests and that
the positive good brought by this change would more than offset the
inherently disruptive effect of uprooting the child."4 9 According to the
court, "the inestimable developmental benefit of a loving home envi-
ronment that is anchored by a successful marriage is undisputed....
The mother's circumstances have also changed, in that she is unable,
while choosing to conduct an open cohabitation with her lesbian life
partner, to provide this benefit."5
The lesson expounded by the courts in these earlier cases, all
decided prior to 2000, was that sexual minority parents would lose
unsupervised or unrestricted contact with their children if they did
not live a closeted life. Some appellate courts in more recent cases,
however, have begun to reverse trial court decisions that impose
these types of restrictions on parents. Five cases, all decided after
45. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 954 (Wyo. 1995) (Golden, C.J., dissenting).
46. Exparte J.M.F., 730 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998).
47. Id. at 1193.
48. Id. (citing testimony of Dr. Sharon Gotlieb).
49. Id. at 1194.
50. Id. at 1196.
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2000, exemplify this shift in the court decisions. In a 2001 Colorado
case, for example, the trial court adopted the mother's request to
restrict the father from "having any other person spend the night
at his home during parenting time and from taking the child to his
church," which has a congregation with a primarily gay orientation.5
The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court because im-
posing the restrictions was not supported by the Colorado visitation
statute's language, which provides that "the court shall not restrict
a parent's parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting
time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair
the child's emotional development."52
In 2002, an Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar result,
striking down a restriction preventing either parent from having
"unrelated adults," with whom he or she was having a relationship,
from spending a night in the home.53 The court of appeals found that
there was "no evidence of any adverse effect upon the children based
upon [the] Mother's sexual [orientation] and relationship with a same-
sex partner."54
Tennessee appellate courts, in three cases since 2000, have also
reversed restrictions on sexual minority parents. In the first case,
a Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not
restricting the mother from having her partner present during over-
night visitation with her daughter.55 The Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals, reinstating the trial court's unrestricted
order of visitation.56 In doing so, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
We may, however, find an abuse of discretion when the record
contains definite evidence that visitation, as ordered, would jeop-
ardize the child in a physical or moral sense. We have carefully
scrutinized the entire record for any evidence that [the child]
has been, or would be, subject to physical or emotional harm from
overnight stays with her mother while [her mother's partner]
was present in the home and have found none."
51. In re Marriage of Dorworth, 33 P.3d 1260, 1260-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129(1)(II)(b)(I) (2005) (adopted from UNIF. MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE ACT § 407, 9A U.L.A. (Part I1) 398 (1998)); id. at 1262; see also Gould v.
Dickens, 143 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (involving a similar visitation statute);
Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 2003) (involving a similar statute and
motion to modify custody).
53. Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. App. 2002).
54. Id. at 1020.
55. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Tenn. 2001).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
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The second Tennessee case involved a restraining order that
restrained the father "from taking the child around or otherwise
exposing the child to his gay lover(s) and/or his gay lifestyle. 5' The
trial court found the father in contempt of the restraining order "for
telling his son that he was gay" and sentenced the father to serve two
days in the county jail.59 The father challenged the language in the
restraining order that prohibited him from informing his son about
his "gay lifestyle., 6' The appellate court found that the language was
not sufficiently specific, as required by the Tennessee statute author-
izing restraining orders.6 Thus the restraining order was unenforce-
able and the father could not be punished for violating the order.62
Most recently, in 2005, a Tennessee court of appeals reversed a
trial court decision changing custody from the mother to the father
based on the assumption that the child would suffer future harm
living with his mother.63 The court noted that "[t] here was no credible
proof in the record to support a finding that the mother's sexual orien-
tation would have an adverse impact on the child as he grew older.
Further, this was not a proper matter of which the court could take
judicial notice."64
A review of these later cases shows a shift from courts assuming
that the parent's homosexuality was, in and of itself, detrimental to
the best interests of the child, to courts requiring concrete evidence
that a parent's homosexuality was causing harm to the child.65 This
requirement has been referred to as the "nexus" approach - there
must be a nexus, or connection, between the parent's sexual orien-
tation and harm to the child.66 Another version of the nexus approach
58. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
59. Id. at 248.
60. Id. at 252, n.6.
61. Id. at 254-55.
62. Id. at 255.
63. Berry v. Berry, No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. May 31, 2005).
64. Id. at *4.
65. It is interesting to note that regardless of the statutory provisions regarding visi-
tation or custody and of the standard of review on appeal, the key factors in the appellate
court decisions appear to be how the court viewed the "harmfulness" of the parents'
sexual orientation or behavior and the willingness of the court to attribute any diffi-
culties the child was experiencing, or might experience in the future, to a parent's sexual
orientation. Compare Roe. v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) and Roberts v. Roberts,
489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985), with In re Marriage of Dorworth, 33 P.3d
1260, 1260-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1020 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002), and Berry v. Berry, No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847 at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2005).
66. See In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Delong v.
Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536 at *11 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998).
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requires a connection between the restricted behavior, for example the
parent's expressions of affection to his or her partner, the presence of
the parent's partner or other homosexuals, or the inclusion of the child
at gay functions, that results in actual harm to the child. 7 Although
some courts assume that any distress or other emotional difficulty
that a child experiences is caused by factors related to the parent's
sexual orientation, other courts interpret the nexus approach as re-
quiring a connection between any emotional difficulties that a child ex-
periences and factors related to the parent's sexual orientation. For
example, in a Washington case, the trial court prohibited the father
from "exhibiting, or participating in displays of affection.., with a
partner" in the presence of his children.6" The court of appeals stated:
We hold that the trial court erred by restricting [the father's]
conduct based on his sexual orientation. The evidence showed
only that the children experienced difficulty adjusting after their
parents' separation. But where the only harm is adjustment, the
remedy is counseling, not restrictions on the parents' lifestyle in
terms of sexual orientation.69
Although the post-2000 cases from Colorado, Indiana, and
Tennessee show that sexual minority parents have been successful
on the appellate court level, these cases are also evidence that trial
judges continue to require parents to live in the closet when their chil-
dren are present. More disturbing, however, is that a closer look at
these particular appellate cases does not reveal an acceptance of par-
ents living open lives. For example, in In re Marriage of Dorworth, the
2001 Colorado case, the court found that the father "agreed it would
be harmful to disclose his sexuality to the child at this time ... ""
In Downey v. Muffley, the 2002 Indiana case, the court distinguished
its holding from that of an earlier Indiana case in which restrictions
were necessary because "the father took the children to a day-long
conference that focused on the concerns of homosexuals, to a lesbian
choir, and to a baptismal service where the minister 'came out as a
gay man."'71 Similarly, in Eldridge v. Eldridge, the 2001 Tennessee
Supreme Court case, the court found that:
67. See Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 664 (Md. Ct. App. 1998); Blew v. Verta, 617
A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Dairon v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871,873,875 (N.D. 2003).
68. In re Marriage of Wickland, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
69. Id. at 653.
70. 33 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
71. 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d
733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).
JUDICIALLY IMPOSED CLOSETS
[the mother and her partner] live in the same home but had slept
in separate bedrooms for three months prior to the hearing....
They have a monogamous relationship but have not been sexually
intimate in over a year. [The mother's partner] characterized them
as "best friends, roommates." They make no expression of "physical
emotion or physical contact" when [the daughter] is in the home."
In Hogue v. Hogue, the 2004 Tennessee case, in which the appel-
late court found the father could not be punished under the language
of the restraining order that prohibited him from exposing the child
to his "gay lifestyle," the appellate court noted that the father did not
challenge that portion of the restraining order that prohibited him
from introducing the child to his "gay lover(s)."73 Consequently, the
appellate court did not address that portion of the restraining order.74
Finally, in Berry v. Berry, the 2005 Tennessee Court of Appeals
case, the court distinguished the facts before it from the facts in a
1988 case, where the child was removed from the mother's custody.75
The court noted that "[i]n Collins the child testified that her mother
slept in the same bed with her female partner, kissed her, hugged her
and told her that she loved her. Because there was no such testimony
in the case at bar, the cases are factually distinguishable."76 In these
aforementioned cases the parents were living closeted lives or chose
not to challenge all of the restrictions imposed on them by the court.
These cases provide evidence that being honest to one's children about
one's sexual orientation77 and displaying affection toward a partner"
or sharing a bedroom with a partner7 9 are activities that continue to
result in courts denying a parent custody of his or her child or restrict-
ing visitation rights.8 "
72. 42 S.W.3d 82, 86-87 (Tenn. 2001).
73. 147 S.W.3d 245, 252 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
74. Id.
75. No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31,
2005).
76. Id.(citing Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I1, 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
27, 1988)).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Collins, 51 P.3d 691, 693 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (stating
that although the child saw her mother kissing her partner, custody should not be
changed to the father because the incidents were "isolated and inadvertent").
79. See Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 732, 734 (Ark. 2003).
80. Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-98-01849-CV, 2001 WL 507221, at *6 (Tex. App. May
15, 2001) (father was not allowed increased visitation in part because his partner lived
with him and both attended events with the children).
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIALLY IMPOSED
CLOSETS
A. Research on the Consequences of Family "Secret-Keeping"
Court rulings in child custody or visitation cases that place re-
strictions on sexual minority parents may have several possible con-
sequences. One potential consequence could be that other sexual
minority parents, who may be considering divorce or who are divorced
but just coming to terms with their sexual orientation, are sent the
message that they may need to live very secretive lives if they want
to maintain unrestricted contact with their children. In reaction to
fears of losing custody or having restricted visits, sexual minority
parents may be forced to keep their sexual orientation secret. Alter-
natively, if they tell someone, they may feel pressure to couple the
disclosure with an assurance from the confidant to keep the secret
from others, including other family members. Either way, this secret-
keeping may be damaging to the parents as well as their families.
Dr. Evan Imber-Black, a renowned family therapist and author
of research on family secrets,8 has found that family relationships
become imbued with distance when individuals keep important aspects
of their lives a secret from the other family members.8 2 People with
secrets grow more isolated in an attempt to prevent the discovery of
the secret.8 3 They become distrustful and denial is prevalent in their
daily lives.8 4 They can develop a negative internal dialogue that in-
cludes repeating to themselves that "if they really knew [my secret,
then] they would dislike me, disrespect me, maybe even disown me." 5
Thus, in the context of a child custody and visitation dispute, this in-
ternal dialogue might encompass the parent's fear that if others knew
the secret, then it could be used to prevent the parent from having
custody or unrestricted visitation with his or her children.
According to Imber-Black, when someone has a secret, those who
are close to that individual, especially family members and children,
often sense something is being kept from them, and they "create their
own fantasies and myths" about the person with the secret.8 6 Family
interactions become based on an illusion. The other family members
may "pursue the content of the secret in ways that ultimately violate
81. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at "About the Author" (noting that the author is a
Professor of Psychiatry at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and a former president
of the American Family Therapy Academy).
82. Id. at 34; see also HARRIET LERNER, THE DANCE OF DECEPTION 85-86, 88-90 (1993).
83. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 34.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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[the secret holder's] privacy or [they] may respond ... with denial
and pervasive distance, [resulting in a] pattern of mutual and es-
calating exclusion. '"" Conversations may become superficial, halting
honest communication and rendering true intimacy unachievable.88
The person with the secret is afraid to be honest for fear of losing
important personal relationships. 9 Ironically, however, this lack of
honesty results in personal relationships becoming superficial.9 ° The
guilt about having a secret may result in individuals feeling they
lack integrity, which can permeate other parts of their lives.91 Because
of the irreconcilable conflict between the fear and the guilt, they could
potentially plunge into a state of depression so black that others
cannot help but notice.
Applying Imber-Black's model to a closeted parent in the context
of a custody or visitation dispute, one can see that, over time, these
parents could suffer from the intense guilt of living a lie. In addition,
they may internalize feelings of homophobia and feel shame for being
gay.92 If parents are aware that local courts restrict contact between
sexual minority parents and their children, then these parents may
feel forced to live a life of denial in order to continue having custody
or unrestricted visitation with their children. This denial could have
very serious consequences for the parents and their children. For
example, some parents may not seek custody, or they may relinquish
custody when they realize that they are struggling with their sexual
orientation.93 Alternatively, out of a fear that others may discover
their orientation, they may set up elaborate schemes to live double
lives.94 They may even believe that they can live two separate lives
having both a "straight" life with their children and a parallel life with
a same-gender relationship, sinking further into a state of denial.95
87. Id.; see also Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 948 (Wyo. 1995) (noting that the
husband insisted the mother sign a stipulation that, in order to have primary custody
of the children, she disavow lesbianism. Less than a year after the divorce, the mother's
parents informed the father, against the mother's wishes, that their daughter was, indeed,
a lesbian. As a consequence of this violation of her privacy, the mother immediately
agreed to transfer the primary custody of the children to the father in return for liberal
visitation rights with her children).
88. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 35.
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 34-35
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. See, e.g., Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that the mother was in a lesbian relationship until shortly before the hearing on
her ex-husband's motion to modify custody. She testified, however, during the trial that
she believed that "the practice of homosexuality [was] morally wrong'). Id.
93. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995).
94. See, e.g., Hassenstab, 570 N.W. 2d. at 374.
95. For example, African American males who chose to "live on the down-low," do
not identify themselves as gay although they have sexual relations with men. J.L. KING,
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This closeted parenting results in some of the most bizarre and in-
credulous testimony concerning the parents' living arrangements,
which is only overshadowed by even more bizarre court orders. The
following three cases from Arkansas, Mississippi, and Missouri are
examples of the dilemma sexual minority parents face in jurisdictions
that historically have not allowed these parents to have custody of
their children.
The first case, Taylor v. Taylor, was decided in Arkansas in
2003.96 The father sued for a change in custody because the mother
lived with an "admitted lesbian."97 The mother and the "admitted
lesbian" had shared the same bed "about half the time" prior to the
father filing for a change in custody, but both denied that they were
sexually intimate." The "admitted lesbian" even testified at trial that
she "did not condone a homosexual lifestyle or advocate it."99
The trial court found as follows:
The [father] here claims the circumstances of the expressed sexual
preference of Kelli [sic] Tabora and the fact that she and defen-
dant [mother] slept together for approximately one year requires
the conclusion that sex occurs. But if the testimony of defendant
and Kelli [sic] Tabora is accepted as the truth what is present
here is that no actual inappropriate behavior but rather the appear-
ance of inappropriate behavior exists. Is that harmful enough to
require removal of these children from that environment? It would
seem likely that if it is generally known by friends and acquain-
tances that defendant resides with and also sleeps with an admit-
ted lesbian, that most will conclude sex is involved. This assump-
tion on the part of the public would subject the children to ridicule
and embarrassment and could very well be harmful to them. There-
fore, it is the conclusion of this Court that residence of Kelli [sic]
Tabora with defendant and the children even without sex is in-
appropriate behavior and is a circumstance that justifies changing
of custody from defendant to plaintiff. It is at least poor parental
judgment on the part of defendant to allow a well known lesbian
to both reside with defendant and the children and sleep in the
same bed with defendant. 100
ON THE DowN Low 6 (2004).
96. 110 S.W.3d 731, 731 (Ark. 2003).
97. Id. at 732.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 732-33.
100. Id. at 734.
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The trial court then restricted the mother's visitation rights with her
children "to overnight visits when Kellie Tabora was not spending the
night with her."1°'
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the
trial court believed the two women's testimony, the only basis for
the trial court's decision was the appearance of impropriety and the
potential for future harm.102 The court stated:
Because no harm has been shown to the children, because there
was no showing that the two women are engaged in a lesbian re-
lationship, and because Kellie Tabora is no longer sleeping in [the
mother's] bed, we disagree that a change of custody premised on
appearances and on the potential for teasing in the future is suffi-
cient to constitute a material change in circumstances. 13
The message sent to sexual minority parents in Arkansas by the court
in this factually strange case is quite clear - to maintain custody of
your children, deny being a sexual minority and testify that there
is no sexual relationship. 14 Furthermore, if you happened to have
been sharing a bed with an "admitted" sexual minority individual,
definitely stop sleeping in the same bed when the other parent files
a change of custody motion.'0 5
The second case, Hollon v. Hollon, was decided in 2001 in
Mississippi.0 6 During her testimony, the mother "freely admitted
that she and [another woman] slept in the same bed. However, she
vehemently denied any sexual relationship existed between her and
[the other woman], continually characterizing their relationship as
platonic."'0 7 Unfortunately, Donna, a friend of the mother's, testified
that the mother had told Donna she was having a sexual relation-
ship with the other woman, a fact that the mother asked Donna to
101. Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Ark. 2003).
102. Id. at 739.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Ratliff, No. CA 02-844, 2003 WL 1856408 at *10-11 (Ark. Ct.
App. Apr. 9, 2005). In Ratliff, the mother moved out of the family residence with the
children and may have been sharing the "living quarters" of a woman with whom the
mother admitted to having a sexual relationship. Id. at 10. However, the mother testi-
fied that the sexual relationship ended six months prior to the entering of the divorce
decree. Id. The appellate court affirmed the award of custody to the mother, noting
"there was an absence of proof of any sharing of a bedroom or sleeping together with the
children residing in the abode." Id. at 10-11.
105. Id.
106. 784 So. 2d 943, 943 (Miss. 2001) (noting that the trial court discussed whether
two people sharing a bed creates a legal presumption that they are engaged in "sexual
activity"). Id. at 950-51.
107. Id. at 945.
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keep secret.'O Because of Donna's testimony, the trial court not only
found the mother's denial untrustworthy but also asked the District
Attorney's office to consider conducting an investigation into whether
the mother had committed perjury.19 The Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed the award of custody to the husband in this case, stating that
the trial court's "defining consideration in determining custody of
[the child] centered on the allegations of [the mother's] homosexual
affair."" Despite the supreme court finding error in the trial court's
reliance on an alleged homosexual affair to determine moral unfit-
ness, four justices joined the concurring opinion which stated that:
[w]ithout question the living arrangement of [the mother with
the other woman] was inappropriate and questionable at best.
However, [the mother] made a positive change in her physical
living arrangements first by terminating the untenable living
arrangements with [the other woman] and then by planning a
move to the newly-remodeled three bedroom house."'
Without these concurring justices, the court could not have reversed
the award of custody to the father."2 Similar to the message being sent
to sexual minority parents in Arkansas, Hollon warns sexual minor-
ity parents of the dangers in telling someone about their orientation.
Even more troubling is the possibility that a vehement denial on the
stand may result in a trial judge requesting the District Attorney to
investigate the parent for committing perjury. One can only imagine
what kind of investigative techniques the District Attorney's office
might use to determine whether the parent is or is not a homosexual.
The Missouri Court of Appeals decided the third case, Delong v.
Delong, in 1998.113 In this case, prior to the custody trial, the mother
repeatedly denied that she was involved in lesbian relationships."'
Under oath, the mother finally admitted to having had sexual relation-
ships with two women."' In response, the trial judge required the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 949.
110. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 953 (Waller, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 952.
113. No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998).
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at n.3. The mother alleged that
"the courtroom became a battleground in which sexual orientation was the
principal issue" and that [the] father and the guardian ad litem became ob-
sessed with dissecting her sexual life, "uncovering every detail of any kiss,
touch or other intimate contact she may have engaged in with a member
of the same sex"
instead of focusing on the best interests of the children. Id. at *3.
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mother to tell her children she was a lesbian; the judge's final order in-
cluded a "telling session" with the mother's older children, in the pres-
ence of the guardian ad litem, in which she was required to admit
to the children she was a lesbian."6 In addition, the trial court found:
that joint custody would not be appropriate and that the children's
best interests would be met if they were in their father's custody.
In making these findings, the [trial] court cited [the] Mother's
engagement "in a promiscuous series of four homosexual affairs,"
her repeated denial and concealment of "her adulterous lesbian
activity," her intention to continue "exposing her lesbian lovers
to her children," and her "immaturity in seeking after repeated
new love relationships."" 7
Although the mother objected to the court's order, by the time the
case reached the Missouri Supreme Court, the "telling session" had
already occurred, so the Missouri Supreme Court considered that
issue moot."' In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the
award of custody to the father."9
All three of these cases are vivid examples of the dilemma sexual
minority parents face when the courts view sexual orientation of the
parent as a negative factor in determining child custody disputes.
In order to have custody or unrestricted visitation of their children,
the parents realize they must live a secret life. In addition, as was
evident in the Taylor and Hollon cases, keeping the secret of the
parent's sexual orientation can also impact the life of the parent's
partner.120 The risk of discovery may require that the partner also
live a closeted life or at least deny that the relationship is a sexual
one if the partner had been living openly as a sexual minority prior
to cohabiting with the parent. Keeping this secret could complicate
the new relationship by forcing the couple to live essentially two
lives. The constant fear that someone will discover the true nature
of their relationship could cause the couple to live in extreme iso-
lation and be dishonest about even the most minuscule aspects of
their lives. Imber-Black reported one case involving a lesbian couple
where one of the women had a child from a previous marriage.'
2
'
116. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at *2.
118. Delongv. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998), affid
sub nom. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1998).
119. Id.
120. See Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 732-33 (Ark. 2003); Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.
2d 943, 946 (Miss. 2001).
121. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 197.
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The couple acted as "roommates" in an attempt to keep their relation-
ship a secret from the mother's family, out of fear that the father
would find out and restrict the mother's contact with the child.'22
Keeping this secret placed enormous stress on the couple's relation-
ship and it dominated and controlled all aspects of their lives.'23
Not only do the adults suffer from the secret-keeping, but Imber-
Black also has found that secrets can be very damaging to children.'24
Children often feel confused and will not understand the tension in
the family home.'25 They will feel distant from the parent who has
the secret and be led to believe it is better not to ask questions and
to be dishonest.'26 Often children will fill the unknown with their
own perceptions, which usually relate to their fear that they are caus-
ing the "problem."'27 These feelings can result in physical problems,
emotional problems, or acting out to move the focus on them rather
than the real issue. 128 In other words, if the children can make them-
selves the "problem," they believe that at least they have control over
that particular problem, diverting attention from the underlying issue
over which they have no control. 1
29
If the sexual minority parent cannot live with the distance and
guilt created by trying to hide their sexual orientation from their chil-
dren, one potential solution to the judicially imposed closet is to share
the secret with the children, warning them that they have to keep
the secret or risk losing their relationship with their parent. How-
ever, when one parent and child know a secret and the other parent
does not, it places the child in an "untenable loyalty bind."'3 ° Accord-
ing to Imber-Black, a confidence between a parent and his or her
child will create a dysfunctional family because the secret always
excludes other vital members of the family.' 3 ' When this happens, a
complicated family dynamic comes into play.'32 Not only is the issue
per se a secret, but the secret-keeping relationship is also hidden.
As a result, families with secret-keeping alliances lose their elasticity
and spontaneity.'33
122. Id. at 197-98.
123. Id. at 197-99.
124. Id. at 224-30.
125. Id. at 259-63.
126. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 247.
127. Id. at 225.
128. Id. at 216-17, 246-47.
129. Id. at 247.
130. Id. at 35.
131. Id. at 36.
132. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 36.
133. Id. at 26
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Imber-Black also found that when parents use children as con-
fidants, "the natural hierarchy of informational decision-making in
a family is turned upside down."1 This situation can result in either
the child having a false sense of power, or, on the opposite pole, the
child sacrificing his or her own emotional well-being to keep the
secret.'35 If the secret is cloaked in covert threats, such as "it will be
your fault if you tell the secret and the situation becomes more
difficult," the relationship with the parent who has the secret can
become marked by distance and mistrust. 136
In the context of a custody and visitation dispute, the child's
false sense of power from knowing the secret might be manifested
when the child tries to manipulate the sexual minority parent by
threatening to disclose the secret. Alternatively, if the child tries to
keep the secret but is unable to do so and the court removes the child
from the parent's home or restricts the parent's contact with the
child, then the child might feel responsible for the court's decision.
In fact, Imber-Black states that a toddler or kindergartener does
not have the developmental ability to keep a secret; they have not
yet developed the capacity to understand family privacy, bound-
aries, or the difference between the private sphere of the family and
the public sphere of the outside world.13' Although adolescents are
capable of understanding these boundaries and can keep "secrets that
maintain privacy or protect the family from unwanted intrusions,"
keeping a secret of this magnitude requires them to use "deception
and evasion on a daily basis, [cutting them off from the other parent],
siblings, extended family or friends."'38 These teenagers are forced
into a situation that jeopardizes their own development, diverting
energy that should go into their lives and activities toward masking
a family secret.
139
Although one could criticize the sexual minority parents for ask-
ing their children to remain silent about the parents' sexual orien-
tation, a court sends this exact message to the children when it
denies custody to the sexual minority parent or imposes restrictions
on the parent when he or she is with the child. This is particularly
true when the child already knows about the parent's sexual orien-
tation because the parent has decided to live openly as a sexual
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 249.
137. IMBER-BLACK, supra note 11, at 239-40.
138. Id. at 247.
139. Id.
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minority. 40 In cases in which the court takes away custody or pro-
hibits the parent's partner from being present during visitation, the
court implies to the child that the parent's sexual orientation must
be hidden not only from the public, but even within the privacy of
that parent's own home."' In addition, when the court orders that
the child cannot have any future contact with the parent's partner,
the court ignores the fact that the child may have a strong and loving
relationship with the parent's partner.
142
Even when the court decides in favor of the sexual minority
parents, many of these decisions contain language that requires the
parents to continue to live in the closet. Numerous cases find that
although the parent is living in a same-gender relationship, the
parent can maintain custody or have unrestricted visitation because
the parent acts with discretion. '43 In these scenarios the parent may
not share a bedroom with the partner,'4 or the couple may not ex-
press affection, hug, or kiss in the presence of the children. 145 One
infers from these cases that the couple must continue to live a closeted
life in their own home if the sexual minority parent wants to main-
tain custody or have unrestricted visitation with the children.
In most of the cases the child's heterosexual parent requests the
restrictions on the sexual minority parent; by accepting the hetero-
sexual parent's fear of homosexuality, the court judicially enforces
that parent's homophobia, imposing it on all the family members.'46
Not only does this ruling send the message to the child that the hetero-
sexual parent's world view is the "correct" one, but it also judicially
sanctions control and power to one parent over the private life of
the sexual minority parent. Such rulings are particularly difficult
for children, who already are caught in a loyalty bind between their
140. See Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Ala. 1998); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908
P.2d 946, 949, 952 (Wyo. 1995); McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 120 (Wyo. 1995).
141. See id.
142. See Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1193 ; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 955 (Golden, C.J.,
dissenting).
143. See Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699,701-02 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); see also McKay
v. Johnson, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658 at *3, 5 (Minn. Ct App. Jan. 16, 1996) (noting
that when the father sought to restrict the mother's visitation, the mother agreed not to
take the children to any gay pride events in the future).
144. E.g., In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the father
"testified that he and his partner each have their own bedroom and few people know
they have a sexual relationship").
145. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82,86-87 (Tenn. 2001); see also In re Marriage
of Collins, 51 P.3d 691,692-93 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that, although the child saw her
mother kissing her partner, custody should not be changed to the father because the
incidents were "isolated and inadvertent"). Id. at 693.
146. See Eileen P. Huff, Comment, The Children of Homosexual Parents: The Voices the
Courts Have Yet to Hear, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 695, 695-96, 711 (2001).
JUDICIALLY IMPOSED CLOSETS
parents through the custody litigation itself. 147 In addition, if the re-
strictions prohibit the parent from having a partner or other gay or
lesbian individuals present when the child is in the parent's home,
the court has forced the gay or lesbian parent to live a closeted life,
without considering the emotional consequences of forcing a "secret"
on the parent or on the child.14 As previously discussed, this court-
imposed requirement of keeping a secret creates distance, guilt,
shame, and fear, in disregard for the best interests of the child."'
B. Research on Sexual Minority Parenting
Social science research on sexual minority parents supports the
position that they are nurturing and effective parents. Furthermore,
it is more emotionally healthy for children to have sexual minority
parents who are open about their orientation than it is for sexual
minority parents to conceal their sexual orientation. o For example,
one longitudinal study involved twenty-five children who were living
with their divorced, lesbian mothers and twenty-one children with
their single, heterosexual mothers.'' The results of the study found
"there was a nonsignificant trend indicating that young people who
were most positive about their lesbian family identity tended to have
mothers who, at the time of the first study, were open about being
a lesbian mother to their son or daughter's school."'52 In addition,
those children "whose mothers reported having had a greater number
of relationships prior to the [first] study, tended to have a more pos-
itive view of their [lesbian] family identity as young adults."'53 Finally,
the results of the follow-up study suggested that the children who
reported that their mothers were involved in the gay rights move-
ment or feminist politics "also tended to be more positive about their
lesbian family identity."'54
147. Id. at 706.
148. Id. at 709.
149. See id. at 715 (noting that awareness of the parent's sexual identity and open
communication concerning his or her sexual orientation is in the best interests of the child
according to scientific studies); see also notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
150. See COOPER & CATES, supra note 12; Kevin F. McNeill, The (Lack of) Differences
Between Gay/Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents: A Review of the Literature, 4 NAT'L
J. SEXUALORIENTATIONL. 10, (1998), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue6/
Mcneill.htm (summarizing articles addressing scientific studies on the parenting skills
of sexual minority parents and the psychological well-being of children raised by sexual
minority parents).
151. Fiona Tasker & Susan Golombok, Young People's Attitudes Toward Living in a
Lesbian Family: A Longitudinal Study of Children Raised by Post-Divorce Lesbian Mothers,
28 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 183, 183 (1997) [hereinafter Young People's Attitudes].
152. Id. at 194.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Another study found that the more open and relaxed a lesbian
mother is about her sexual orientation, the more accepting her child
is of her orientation. 15 5 In addition, the more realistic the mother is
about the potential problems of being a lesbian mother, the more suc-
cessful her children are in adjusting to their non-traditional family."
Another comparative study found that adolescents tend to be more
accepting of their mother's lesbianism if they learn about it in early
childhood.
157
In some areas, lesbian mothers showed better outcomes than their
single heterosexual counterparts. For example, heterosexual single
mothers express more feelings of inferiority and deference when com-
pared to lesbian mothers, who tend to have higher self-confidence
and dominance.'58 Lesbian mothers are also more likely to own their
homes or have a business than single heterosexual mothers.'59 Lesbian
mothers are not detracted from their parenting responsibilities when
they have a partner,6 ° and they are more child-oriented in their re-
sponses to the children than heterosexual single mothers.'6 ' One study
found that children had a more positive relationship with the mother's
partner when the partner was a female, as opposed to a male.'62 In
addition, in one study comparing lesbian co-parents with married het-
erosexual couples, ninety percent of the biological or adoptive mothers'
partners shared childrearing tasks, whereas only thirty-seven percent
of heterosexual fathers did so with their own children. 163
Studies of gay fathers, when compared with heterosexual fathers,
also show that sexual orientation was not a detrimental factor in their
parenting ability. 164 In fact, gay fathers exhibited greater respon-
siveness to their children than heterosexual fathers.165 Both gay and
155. Saralie Pennington, Children of Lesbian Mothers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
58,63 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987).
156. Id.
157. Sharon Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of
Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITYAND
THE FAMILY 123, 133-34 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989).
158. Richard Green, et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with
Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV.
167, 173 (1986).
159. Mildred D. Pagelow, Heterosexual and Lesbian Single Mothers: A Comparison of
Problems, Coping, and Solutions, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 189, 203 (1980).
160. Charlotte Patterson & Richard Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Children:
Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, J. SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1996, at 29, 40.
161. Judith Miller, et al., The Child's Home Environment for Lesbian vs. Heterosexual
Mothers: A Neglected Area of Research, 7 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 49, 55 (1981).
162. FIONA L. TASKER & SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP IN A LESBIAN FAMILY: EFFECTS
ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT 53 (1997); Young People's Attitudes, supra note 150, at 184.
163. Garry Cooper, Network Briefs, FAM.THERAPYNETWORKER, July-Aug. 1997, at 15, 15.
164. Jerry Bigner & R. Brooke Jacobsen, Parenting Behaviors of Homosexual and
Heterosexual Fathers, 18 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 173, 176, 180-81 (1989).
165. Id. at 180.
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heterosexual fathers tend to have positive relationships with their
children. 6 The gay and heterosexual fathers also showed no dif-
ference in their level of involvement with their children in such areas
as general problem solving, encouraging autonomy, and handling prob-
lems related to child rearing. 167 Gay fathers, however, tended to be
more consistent in stressing "the importance of setting and enforc-
ing limits ..... plac[ed] greater emphasis on verbal communica-
tions, [were] more responsive to [their children's] perceived needs,"
and went to greater "lengths to act as a resource for activities with
children when compared with many nongay fathers."168
One study of gay fathers particularly relevant to the negative
consequences of a judicially imposed closet finds that children of gay
fathers do not have concerns about their fathers fulfilling their paren-
tal roles.'69 If children see a negative social reaction to gay men, how-
ever, this causes them stress regarding their father's identity as a
gay man. 70 This study advised that children should be informed of
the myths and stereotypes about homosexuals, so that they under-
stand that these myths and stereotypes do not accurately represent
most gay men.'7 ' In applying the results of this study to judicial
decision making, judges should be aware that issuing a ruling, which
accepts myths and stereotypes about gay men and refuses custody
or restricts visitation based on sexual orientation, could create even
more stress for the child.
In a number of custody and visitation cases, some judges appear
so convinced that children will be harmed by a parent who is open
about his or her sexual orientation that they refuse to accept the re-
sults of social science research on sexual minority parenting, much of
which is based on similar life situations, such as children of divorce
who are being raised by a sexual minority parent.'72 Contradictory
to many of the perceived fears expressed by the trial courts, social
science research does not support that these children will suffer from
social rejection, be less psychologically healthy, be sexually abused,
be at risk for AIDS, be harmed by being exposed to other sexual minor-
ities, be confused about their gender identity, "emulate" homosexual
behavior, or not have role models from both genders.'73
166. Id. at 176.
167. Id. at 180-81.
168. Id.
169. Frederick W. Bozett, Social Control of Identity by Children of Gay Fathers, 10
W. J. NURSING RES. 550, 555 (1988).
170. Id. at 555, 562.
171. Id. at 562.
172. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.AG., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "the
trial court has the authority to find the [social science studies] presented not credible").
173. See COoPER & CATES, supra note 12, and D.L. Hawley, Custody and Visitation of
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If, however, the purpose of the court in denying custody or restrict-
ing visitation is to send a message to the sexual minority parent and
their children that they should adopt the judge's belief that homo-
sexuality is "an unnatural [and] immoral" act'74 and the judge wishes
to express disapproval of or even punish the parent for "becoming"
a homosexual, leaving the marriage, living unashamed as a sexual
minority, or having a same-gender domestic partnership, then the
results of the studies are, indeed, irrelevant. Even an expert wit-
ness, testifying that the denial of custody to a sexual minority will
have serious psychological consequences for the child, will not deter
a judge with this type of mind-set.175 These judges, often fueled by
a similarly thinking parent who objects to the sexual minority parent
having custody or unrestricted visitation with the child, remain imper-
vious to any evidence other than their own value system.7 6
For those judges who endeavor to minimize the emotional tur-
moil of the children caught in a custody or visitation dispute, these
studies provide evidence that a judicially imposed closet will not serve
that purpose. Based on the numerous studies about sexual minority
parenting coupled with Imber-Black's research on the detrimental
consequences of family secrets, the court will most likely only exacer-
bate the stress and anxiety of children of sexual minority parents
if the court restricts the parent's contact with the child and requires
the parent to live a closeted life.'7 7
III. OTHER SEXUAL MINORITY PARENTING CASES
In direct contrast to the child custody and visitation cases, most
courts dealing with sexual minority parents accept the large body
of social science studies. Courts in these cases assert that sexual
minority parents who are open about their sexual orientation and
are fully integrated into society as sexual minority individuals raise
happy, healthy, and well-adjusted children.
Children by Gay and Lesbian Parents, in 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 403, §§ 3-12 (2006)
for a review of the findings of social science research concerning sexual minority parenting.
174. See Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30,
1988) (Tomlin, P. J., concurring).
175. E.g., Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998) (upholding the trial court's
decision to change custody from the lesbian mother to the father in spite of psycho-
logical testimony finding a healthy mother-child relationship and likely detrimental
mental health consequences if a change in custody were to occur).
176. See, e.g., id. at 1196; Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946,949-52 (Wo. 1996); S.E.G.
v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also supra note 174 and accom-
panying text.
177. See supra notes 82-91, 150-73 and accompanying text.
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A. Same-Gender Marriage
In recent cases in which same-gender couples seek the right to
marry, courts have extensively examined the issue of whether it is in
the best interests of children to be raised by sexual minority parents.
In some of the same-gender marriage cases, the State argued, often
unsuccessfully, that same-gender couples should not be allowed to
marry because a same-gender household is not the optimal environ-
ment in which to raise children.'78 The evidence presented to counter
this argument consisted of expert testimony about the ability of sexual
minorities as parents in general,'79 rather than looking specifically at
the parenting skills of the petitioners who challenged the marriage
statutes. In that context, the trial court in the remanded Hawaii case
of Baehr v. Miike held that the state of Hawaii could not demonstrate
that the development of children raised by sexual minority parents
was adversely impacted. 80 Various experts testified at the trial that
sexual minority parents are fit parents and sexual orientation does
not serve as an indicator of parental fitness or "how well the children
do in terms of a child's well-being and adjustment."'' Even the state's
expert witnesses agreed that sexual minority parents can and do
"maintain stable and nurturing homes and are capable of raising
physically and psychologically healthy children."'8 2
One of the experts, a practitioner in the area of adoption and
foster care, testified that, based on his experience, sexual minority
parents provided "warm and loving environments."'8 3 Another expert,
a pediatrician who had worked with adolescent children of sexual
minority parents, stated that these children were as mentally and
physically healthy as children raised by heterosexual parents. 8 4
Although the doctor admitted that some teenagers in these families
have experienced embarrassment or distress or have had a difficult
time because of their nontraditional family structure, he went on to
say that "they get through these periods. And if anything, I think
they grow stronger through that experience. They learn about life.
They learn about diversity .... The research confirms that - that
teenagers get through this period."'8 6 Based on the evidence of the
expert witnesses in this case, the court made the following findings:
178. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996); Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
179. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235 at *11-16.
180. Id. at *18.
181. Id. at *13, (citing testimony of Charlotte Patterson, Ph.D.).
182. Id. at *4, *5, *7 (citing testimony of Kyle D. Pruett, M.D. and David Eggebeen,
Ph.D.).
183. Id. at *14, (citing testimony of David Brodzinsky, Ph.D.).
184. Id. at *16 (citing testimony of Robert Bidwell, M.D.).
185. Id.
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125. The evidence presented by Plaintiffs and Defendant estab-
lishes that the single most important factor in the development
of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing rela-
tionship between parent and child.
More specifically, it is the quality of parenting or the "sensitive
care-giving" described by David Brodzinsky, which is the most
significant factor that affects the development of a child.
126. The sexual orientation of parents is not in and of itself an
indicator of parental fitness.
127. The sexual orientation of parents does not automatically
disqualify them from being good, fit, loving or successful parents.
128. The sexual orientation of parents is not in and of itself an
indicator of the overall adjustment and development of children.
129. Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples have the poten-
tial to raise children that are happy, healthy and well-adjusted.
130. Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples are allowed
to adopt children, provide foster care and to raise and care for
children.
131. Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can provide
children with a nurturing relationship and a nurturing environ-
ment which is conducive to the development of happy, healthy
and well-adjusted children.
132. Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can be as fit
and loving parents, as non-gay men and women and different-
sex couples.
133. While children of gay and lesbian parents and same-sex
couples may experience symptoms of stress and other issues
related to their non-traditional family structure, the available
scientific data, studies and clinical experience presented at trial
suggests [sic] that children of gay and lesbian parents and same-
sex couples tend to adjust and do develop in a normal fashion."
In a recent same-gender marriage case, Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health, the court found that the state's argument against
same-gender marriage, that heterosexual marriages were the optimal
186. Id. at *17.
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setting for raising children, did not meet the rational basis test."'
According to the court, "[t]he 'best interests of the child' standard
does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation or marital status."188
In addition, the court stated that:
the marriage restriction impermissibly "identifies persons by
a single trait and then denies them protection across the board."
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 116 S.Ct. 1260, 134 L.Ed.
2d 855 (1996). In so doing, the State's action confers an official
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex
relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-
sex relationships and are not worthy of respect."i 9
Based on findings in the marriages cases it appears that, for the
experts to conduct research about sexual minority parenting, the
parents in these studies were living sufficiently open lives in order
for them to be identified as sexual minority parents. In addition,
these parents were likely "out" to their children, who also were the
subjects of the studies. 9 ° In particular, if the experts were address-
ing concerns about the potential consequences of outsiders' negative
reactions toward the children who did not have heterosexual parents,
then it is also apparent that in these studies the parents' sexual orien-
tation was common knowledge in their communities.' 9 ' Within that
context, the studies conducted by these expert witnesses showed
that sexual minority parents and, in particular, same-gender couples
who are open about their sexual orientation, are raising healthy,
well-adjusted children.'92
B. Foster Care
Courts also discuss sexual minority parenting in the context of
litigation that challenges regulations prohibiting non-heterosexuals
from being foster parents. 193 For example, a recent Arkansas case
struck down the Arkansas Child Welfare Agency Review Board's
prohibition against homosexuals caring for, or living with, foster
children.'94 As in the same-gender marriage cases, experts testified
187. 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003).
188. Id. at 963.
189. Id. at 962.
190. See, e.g., Baehr, 1996 WL 694235 at *12-16.
191. See id. at *16.
192. See id. at *13, *16.
193. See, e.g., infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
194. Dept. Human Services & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, No. 05-814,
2006 WL 1779467 (Ark. June 29, 2006). The standard states:
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about whether it is in the best interests of children to be raised by
sexual minorities. One expert, a psychologist authorized by the
Arkansas Psychological Association to testify in the case, stated
that her analysis of many studies revealed that "the sexual orien-
tation of the parents did not negatively affect the development of
the child, result in any kind of pathology, [and] was not contraindi-
cated for child health."'95 Another expert in psychology testified "there
is no child welfare basis to categorically exclude gay people from being
foster parents, that such categorical exclusion could be harmful to pro-
moting children's healthy adjustment because it excludes a pool of
effective foster parents.""19 Based on the expert testimony, the trial
court found that:
27. There are four well known predictors of healthy child adjust-
ment: (I) the quality of the child's relationship with the parent
primarily responsible for his or her care[;] (ii) the relationship
the child has with another parent figure; (iii) the quality of the
relationships between the adults; and (iv) the resources avail-
able to the child.
28. The traditional family form is now the minority family form
in this country.
29. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of
problems in adjustment for children.
30. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of
psychological problems for children.
31. Being raised by gay parents does not increase the risk of
behavioral problems.
32. Being raised by gay parents does not prevent children from
forming healthy relationships with their peers and others.
No person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of that persons
household is a homosexual. Homosexual, for purposes of this rule, shall
mean any person who voluntarily and knowingly engages in or submits to
any sexual contact involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person of the same gender, and who has engaged in such
activity after the foster home is approved or at a point in time that is reason-
ably close in time to the filing of the application to be a foster parent.
Ark. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare
Agencies § 200.3.2 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.arkansas.gov/dhhs/chilnfam/
PUB%2004%20-%2OFeb%2022,%2002.PDF.
195. Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV1999-9881 2004 WL 3154530
at *4 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (citing testimony of Dr. Cheralyn Powers).
196. Id. at *6 (citing testimony of Dr. Michael Lamb).
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33. Being raised by gay parents does not cause academic problems.
34. Being raised by gay parents does not cause gender identity
problems.
35. Both men and women have the capacity to be good parents
and there is nothing about gender, per se, that affects one's ability
to be a good parent.
36. There are benefits to children's adjustment in having two
parents as opposed to one parent and children in single parent
families are more likely to have adjustment difficulties than
children in two parent families.
37. Children of lesbian or gay parents are equivalently adjusted
to children of heterosexual parents.
38. There is no factual basis for making the statement that hetero-
sexual parents might be better able to guide their children through
adolescence than gay parents.
39. There is no factual basis for making the statement that
the sexual orientation of a parent or foster parent can predict
children's adjustment.
40. There is no factual basis for making the statement that being
raised by lesbian or gay parents has a negative effect on children's
adjustment.
41. There is no reason in which the health, safety, or welfare of a
foster child might be negatively impacted by being placed with a
heterosexual foster parent who has an adult gay family member
residing in that home.197
As with the same-gender marriage cases, the court based its
findings on expert witnesses interacting with sexual minorities who
were effectively "out" in their communities. 19 More specifically, the
sexual minority petitioners in this case openly acknowledged their
sexual orientation to the state foster care officials, resulting in their
being disqualified as foster care parents.'9 9 Consequently, the court
reached its findings with the same underlying assumption as in the
same-gender marriage cases: sexual minority parents who are open
197. Id. at *3.
198. Id. at *2-7.
199. Id. at *2. Plaintiff was a married heterosexual man whose adult gay son occa-
sionally lived with him. In this case, the son was "out" to his parents.
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about their sexual orientation are fit parents raising healthy, well-
adjusted children.
C. Adoption
The previous cases involving same-gender marriage and foster
care address the issue of sexual minority parenting broadly, asking
whether having non-heterosexual parents negatively impacts chil-
dren's development. The majority of the adoption cases, however, focus
specifically on the parenting abilities of the particular adoption peti-
tioners. The obvious exception is the Florida case of Lofton v. Secretary
of the Department of Children and Family Services, in which the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
a Florida statute prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children.2"
According to Florida Senator Curtis Peterson, one of the main spon-
sors of the bill that resulted in the adoption prohibition, the law's pur-
pose was to send a message to sexual minorities that, "[w]e're really
tired of you. We wish you'd go back into the closet."' '
The posture of the Lofton case is similar to the marriage and
foster care cases, as opposed to the other adoption cases, because
the petitioners made constitutional claims to obtain the same rights
granted to heterosexuals. °2 The Court of Appeals rejected these con-
stitutional arguments, finding that the parties did not have any lib-
erty interests in becoming adoptive parents and, unlike the Vermont,
Hawaii, and Massachusetts marriage cases, found that a rational
basis existed for the unequal treatment of homosexual and hetero-
sexual couples. °3 In addressing the social science research on sexual
minority parenting the court stated that "the legislature might con-
sider, and even credit, the research cited by appellants, but find it pre-
mature to rely on a very recent and still developing body of research,
particularly in light of the absence of longitudinal studies.., of
200. 358 F.3d 804, 827 (llth Cir. 2004). Interesting to note, however, is that sexual
minorities are allowed to act as foster parents in Florida. See Cheryl Wetzstein, High
Court Lets Stand Ban on Gay Adoption, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2005, at Al.
201. Jessica Berman & Kenneth Leichter, Note, Family Law Chapter: Adoption and
Foster Care, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 667, 688 n.152 (2005).
202. Compare Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808 (noting that the appellants' "complaint alleged
that the statute violates [their] fundamental rights and principles of equal protection"),
and Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(holding that "the sex-based classification [required to get a marriage license was]
unconstitutional and in violation of the equal protection clause"), with Dep't. Human
Services & Child Welfare Agency Rev. Bd. v. Howard, No. 05-814 (Ark. June 29, 2006)
(noting that the appellee's cross-appeal claimed that a regulation preventing homo-
sexuals from becoming foster parents violated equal protection and privacy rights).
203. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 811, 821-22. See supra Part IIlA for a discussion of Baker v.
State of Vermont, Baehr v. Miike, and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.
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adopted, rather than natural, children of homosexual parents."2 4 The
court also claimed that "[o]penly homosexual households represent
a very recent phenomenon, and sufficient time has not yet passed
to permit any scientific study of how children raised in those house-
holds fare as adults."20 5 Lofton, however, is distinguishable from the
other sexual minority adoption cases because they involve fact-specific
examinations of the best interests of a particular child.
The standard in these adoption cases is whether granting the
adoption is in the best interest of the child, requiring the court to make
a factual analysis of the ability of the prospective adopting parent
or parents to care for the children they are seeking to adopt.20 6 In
almost all of the adoption cases involving sexual minority adopting
parents, the sexual orientation of the petitioners is not directly in
issue and is mentioned along with numerous other facts concerning
the prospective adoptive parents. 20 7 For example, in one Indiana
case a lesbian couple decided to be co-parents.20 s One of the women
adopted two Ethiopian children and one Chinese child. 2 9 The adop-
tive mother's partner then filed a petition to adopt the three children
without terminating the parental rights of her partner, to enable the
couple to become legal parents of the children.210 The court mentioned
the relationship without unduly focusing on the sexual orientation
of the parties: 'The petitioner and [her partner] have been companions
in a single sex partnership for the past eight years .... [The couple]
204. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 825.
205. Id. at 826. This statement ignores the results of several existing longitudinal
studies. See COOPER & CATES, supra note 12, at 25, 51-53, 67-69.
206. See In re Petition of C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); In re
Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535,
536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 55 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2000).
207. But see In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d at 56 (in which the grandparents of
the child raised the issue of the sexual orientation of the adoptive parent); In re Petition
of C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d at 676 (in which the trial court raised the issue of the sexual orien-
tation of the petitioners). The appellate court in C.M.A. stated that the trial judge showed:
extreme and patent bias against the adoptive parents based upon their
sexual orientation. This bias was manifest in numerous ways, including her
insensitive probing and wrongful interrogation of the adoptive parents' early
sexual history. We can conceive of no legitimate motive or worthwhile pur-
pose for questioning the petitioners on such clearly irrelevant matters....
[S]he not only injected inadmissible facts into each of the cases, but also
inflicted anguish on the petitioners and needlessly prolonged what should
have been a simple and straightforward process.
Id. at 679.
208. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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appears to [have established] a relaxed and comfortable household." '211
Similarly, in a second Indiana case in which the partner filed a peti-
tion to adopt her partner's biological children from a previous mar-
riage,212 the court merely referred to the adoption petitioner as the
mother's "partner" '213 or as the "second parent" '214 and stated that the
mother and her partner are "both integral members of the proposed
adoptive family" 1 5 and both were "acting as parents."21 6
If the adoption court addresses the issue of the sexual orientation
of the parents, it usually does so in the context of whether the parents
have the ability to deal effectively with the fact that the child is being
raised in a same-gender household. For example, in a 1995 adoption
case in New Jersey the home study report of the Children's Aid and
Adoption Society stated:
[Hannah] and [Mary] plan to be open and honest with the children
about the circumstances of their birth and non-traditional family
composition. Their plan is to provide the children with information
suitable to their ability to understand. More detail is to be fur-
nished as the twins mature. Both parents want the children to
have good self esteem and a good sense of gender identity. They
will provide the children every opportunity for an excellent edu-
cation and development of skills and talents.217
Similar to the New Jersey case, a New York case cited a home study
report that stated "[b]oth women understand that there will be
questions they will have to deal with when the children become
knowledgeable about the family lifestyle. It is my belief that they
will deal with these concerns in a loving and honest manner.""2 '
Also, in a 1993 Massachusetts adoption case, the court con-
sidered not only evidence about the specific petitioners, but also
studies about sexual minority parents in general.21 9 In addition to
over a dozen character witnesses, the court heard from
[a] court-appointed guardian ad litem, Dr. Steven Nickman, assis-
tant clinical professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School,
[who] conducted a clinical assessment of Tammy and her family
211. Id.
212. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (the
children's biological father consented to the adoption by the mother's partner).
213. Id.
214. Id. at. 1255.
215. Id. at 1258.
216. Id. at 1258.
217. In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. 1995).
218. In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994).
219. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316-17 (Mass. 1993).
JUDICIALLY IMPOSED CLOSETS
with a view toward determining whether or not it would be in
Tammy's best interests to be adopted by Helen and Susan. Dr.
Nickman considered the ramifications of the fact that Tammy
will be brought up in a "non-standard" family. As part of his report,
he reviewed and referenced literature on child psychiatry and
child psychology which supports the conclusion that children raised
by lesbian parents develop normally.22°
As in the marriage and foster care cases, 21 in the adoption cases
the petitioners' sexual orientation was well known within their com-
munities, and the persons requesting the adoption were open about
their status as sexual minorities.222 Consequently, the adoption
court made its findings with the same underlying assumption as in
the marriage and foster care cases: sexual minority parents who are
open about their sexual orientation are fit parents raising healthy,
well-adjusted children.
IV. A COMPARISON OF ADOPTION CASES WITH CUSTODY AND
VISITATION CASES
One of the striking features of the custody and visitation cases
is how the heterosexual parent's strong objections concerning the
other parent's sexual orientation seems to trigger the courts to accept,
without question, the stereotypical fears and myths about homosex-
uals.223 This reaction appears in many of the custody and visitation
cases in which the trial court willingly implements the heterosexual
parent's request that the sexual minority parent must live "in the
closet" in order to have access to his or her child.224 In fact it appears
that the more adamantly opposed a parent is to the other parent's
sexual orientation the more convinced the court becomes that it is
appropriate to deny custody or restrict visitation of the gay or les-
bian parent. 225 The court reflexively adopts the parent's request to
restrict the sexual minority parent's life, particularly if the other
220. Id. at 317.
221. See supra Parts III.A and III.B.
222. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 317; In re Adoption of KS.P., 804 N.E.2d
1253, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267,268 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d at 536-37; In re Adoption
of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
223. See Kendell, supra note 23, at 21 (noting that in spite of extensive social science
research concluding that "a parent's sexual orientation has no significant negative effect
on children.... lesbian and gay parents continue to lose custody of their children in
courts across the country. Such decisions reveal persistent myths about lesbian or gay
parents and their children").
224. See, e.g., J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 337, 339-40 (Mo. 1998); see also Hertzler
v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949, 951 (Wyo. 1995).
225. Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 951.
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parent is sharing a residence and a bed or if the parent kisses and
hugs his or her partner while the children are present.22
In many of the cases in which the court changes custody or places
restrictions on the parents, the children know about, or have lived
with, the parent and the parent's partner.2 7 It is because the parent
has been open about his or her sexual orientation that the court feels
compelled to accept the heterosexual parent's fears, even to the point
of uprooting the child from a stable, happy home environment.228 This
bias results in the court not only ignoring the best interests of the
child but also failing to recognize the serious emotional consequences
of judicially imposing a closeted life on the parent and the children.229
The phenomenon of trial courts accepting the stereotypical fears
about homosexuals rarely appears in adoption cases.23 ° For example,
it is very likely that the courts view with approval sexual minority
couples in the adoption cases who share a bed and display mutual
affection and support for each other.23' In a New York adoption case,
to support the court's position that the adoptive petitioners had a
stable relationship, the court stated that the "petition and support-
ing documents establish that petitioners have resided together since
1981 in a committed relationship, and publicly demonstrated their
commitment by participating in a 'Commitment Ceremony' recog-
nized by the Episcopal Church and by registering as domestic partners
in the City of Rochester."2"2 By comparison, in custody and visitation
cases, similar facts have been used against sexual minority parents.233
226. See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, No. E2004-01832-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1277847 at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005 May 31, 2005) (noting that "[i]n Collins the child testified that her
mother slept in the same bed with her female partner, kissed her, hugged her and told her
that she loved her. Because there was no such testimony in the case at bar, the cases are
factually distinguishable') (referring to Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL 30173
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1998)).
227. See, e.g., Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Ala. 1998); JA.D., 978 S.W.2d at
337; Collins, No. 87-238-I1, 1988 WL 30173, at *10; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 949.
228. See, e.g., Exparte J.M.F., 730 So.2d at 1194, 1196.
229. See supra Part II for a discussion of the emotional consequences of closeting one's
sexual identity.
230. See generally Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How
Judicial Imaginations Intertwine with the Best Interests of Children, 11 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the use of language in custody and visitation cases,
in comparison to adoption cases); Bradley Zane Haumont & Susan Ann Koenig, Miss
Susan's Etiquette Tips for the Socially Conscious Judge: A Guide to Honorable Conduct
Toward Gays and Lesbians in the Courtroom, 24 ST. LOUIs U. PUB. L. REV. 221 (2005)
(presenting a humorous approach to instructing courts on proper etiquette when dealing
with sexual minorities).
231. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 2004).
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Exparte J.M.F., 730 So.2d 1190, 1194, 1196 (Ala. 1998); Hertzler v.
Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949, 952 (Wyo. 1995).
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Two probable reasons exist for the difference between the adop-
tion and custody or visitation cases. First, adoption cases generally are
not contested cases, therefore there is no party present in the court-
room to raise the stereotypical fears about homosexuality. Second, evi-
dence in adoption cases concerning the best interests of the child many
times includes the testimony or report of a social worker whose pro-
fessional ethics prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.2"4
In addition, the social workers may have had experience with sexual
minority parents in the past and may have first-hand knowledge
that supports the studies of homosexual parents, which find that
sexual orientation is not a relevant factor in good parenting.
235
These differences between the child custody cases and adoption
cases, however, can be contradicted by the rare case of contested
adoption, where the contesting party raises the stereotypical fears
about parents who are sexual minorities. In one contested adoption
case, In re Adoption of M.J.S.,where the grandparents, Mr. and Mrs.
Snyder, attempted to intervene in the adoption of their grandchild
by a lesbian,2 36 the Tennessee appellate court opinion reads more
like a custody or visitation case than an adoption case involving
sexual minority parents. In this case the Snyders' daughter had given
physical custody of her infant son to Ms. Langston, together with an
executed surrender of her parental rights in favor of Langston.237
Langston lived in a same-gender relationship with another woman,
Ms. Craig, and the Snyders attempted to petition for adoption and
oppose Langston's adoption, claiming that it was not in the best in-
terests of the child to be adopted by a homosexual.238 During trial
Langston's testimony matches testimony in many of the child custody
cases in which sexual minority parents find themselves faced with the
loss of custody or restricted visitation.239 Like the parents in custody
cases, Langston downplayed or recast the nature of her relationship
with Craig, referring to Craig as her "roommate. 24° When questioned
more about the relationship, Langston admitted that they had had
a previous sexual relationship, but the sexual relationship ended
234. NAT'L ASS'N. OF SOCIAL WORKERS, SOCIAL WORK SPEAKS, NAT'L ASS'N OF SOCIAL
WORKERS POLICY STATEMENTS 2000-2003 197 (5th ed. 2000).
235. See NATL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL
PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW 1, 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.nclrights.
org/publications/pubs/adptn0204.pdf (summarizing research that found that sexual orien-
tation is not a relevant factor in good parenting); COOPER& CATES, supra note 12, at 25-73.
236. 44 S.W.3d 41, 46, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
237. Id. at 46.
238. Id. at 46, 56.
239. See Part I for a discussion of custody and visitation cases involving sexual
minority parents.
240. In re Adoption of M.J.S. 44 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
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when Langston received physical custody of the child.241 Langston
also testified that Craig and she did not share a bedroom.2
42
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed Langston's adoption
and the trial court's determination that the Snyders did not qualify
as adoption petitioners under the Tennessee adoption statute.243
Although the Snyders questioned Ms. Langston's living arrange-
ment and her ability to raise a male child, the court observed:
[Tihe record contains little evidence as to what, if any, effects this
factor might have on the child. The evidence showed that Langston
and her roommate maintained separate bedrooms and had ceased
their sexual relationship since the child came into the home. They
did not rule out the possibility of resuming their sexual relation-
ship at some future date, but their present focus is on parenting
their respective children. Langston acknowledged the child's need
for interaction with adult males, and she expressed her commit-
ment to providing opportunities for such interaction.144
The dissent in this case, however, relied on the Tennessee child
custody and visitation cases where sexual orientation was in issue,
arguing that "the preponderance of the evidence [did] not support
a finding that adoption into a lesbian household [was] in the best
interests of this child."2 45 The court further noted:
The clear picture that emerges from the trial is that Langston
and Ms. Craig are lesbians, and that they have been living in a
sexual, pseudo-marriage relationship with each other for a number
of years. According to Langston, the two women were very close
friends, and intended to live together forever. Ms. Craig pushed
Langston to adopt this child, and played an active role in the entire
adoption process. Ms. Craig cares for the child when Langston is
at work. The women's sexual relationship, by Ms. Craig's account,
ended only in April or May of 1998, at approximately the same
time that the birth mother delivered the child to Langston. At the
time of the trial, the women were reevaluating their decision to
cease their sexual activity, and Ms. Craig admitted that there was
a possibility that they would resume having sex with one another
in the future. Ms. Craig stated that she felt no shame about
their sexual relationship. The only reasonable inference that can
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 61.
244. Id. at 57.
245. In re Adoption of M.J.S. 44 S.W.3d 41, 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (Tomlin, Sp. J.,
dissenting).
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be drawn from these facts is that the child, if allowed to remain
with Langston, will be raised in a household consisting of open,
practicing lesbians who will co-parent the boy. In my view, such
an arrangement cannot be and is not in the best interests of any
child.2 48
In sharp contrast to the Tennessee adoption case is an Illinois
adoption case, in which the trial court sua sponte raised the issue of
sexual orientation.247 The trial judge did not ask any questions about
the child's welfare but instead "question[ed] each petitioner regarding
her'coming out' process as a lesbian, her early sexual experiences, and
whether petitioners were currently in a lesbian sexual relationship."24
The appellate court removed the trial judge from the case be-
cause of "extreme and patent bias against the adoptive parents based
upon their sexual orientation." '249 The appellate court found the judge's
"bias was manifest in numerous ways, including her insensitive prob-
ing and wrongful interrogation of the adoptive parents' early sexual
history. We can conceive of no legitimate motive or worthwhile purpose
for questioning the petitioners on such clearly irrelevant matters. 250
According to the appellate court, the petitioners came to court re-
questing an adoption of "children with whom they had already formed
a loving relationship over a period of time. A higher purpose cannot
be imagined. To have the petitioners treated in the manner that they
were is nothing less than appalling. 2 1
This second adoption case differs radically from the previous
Tennessee case, where the adoption was challenged by the grand-
parents.252 Not only was the sexual nature of the petitioner's relation-
ship with her partner seen as relevant in the Tennessee case, but
because she had ceased the sexual relationship and the two women
did not share a bedroom, the appellate court found that the adoption
was in the best interests of the child.253 In the Illinois case, however,
246. Id. at 68 (Tomlin, Sp. J., dissenting). As pointed out by the concurring opinion,
the dissent applied the per se analysis, that homosexuals are per se unfit to raise a
child, to reach the conclusion that Langston's adoption was not in the best interests of
the child. Id. at 62 (Highers, J., concurring). According to the concurring judge, however,
Tennessee is not a per se jurisdiction. Id. Thus, by applying the nexus approach, the
concurring judge found that there was insufficient evidence that Langston's sexual orien-
tation adversely affected the child. Id.
247. In re Petition of C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 679.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 680.
252. In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
253. Id. at 56.
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as in most other adoption cases involving sexual minorities, infor-
mation about the adoptive parents' sexuality is not only irrelevant
but to inquire about it was "nothing less than appalling. 25 4
V. APPLYING NEUTRAL FACTORS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION
CASES
To promote the best interests of children, the position of the
Illinois court and the majority of the other adoption cases should
serve as a model for courts that deal with custody and visitation
disputes between parents when the heterosexual parent raises un-
founded fears about sexual orientation. The courts should begin from
the premise, supported by scientific research, that sexual minority
parents who are open about their sexual orientation raise happy,
healthy, and well-adjusted children.255 Consequently, as in the major-
ity of adoption cases, the issue of sexual orientation should not be a
relevant factor in an initial custody decision.
In addition, because the majority of courts refuse to use marital
fault as a factor in making initial custody orders2 5' and instead look
at the child's best interests, a parent's decision to end a marriage
based on incompatibility because of the parent's homosexuality should
not be a factor in awarding custody. Instead, the courts should apply
the custody factors in a neutral fashion, focusing on the parent-
child relationship to determine which parent-child relationship is
in the best interests of the child.
A parent's attempt to impose restrictions on a sexual minority
parent based on stereotypical misinformation about homosexuality
also may be evidence that this parent is unwilling or unable to re-
spect and appreciate the bond between the child and the other parent
and to allow for a continuing relationship between the child and the
other parent, a factor relevant to determining the best interests of
the child.25 7 Instead of accepting these homophobic fears, the court
should react with suspicion and circumspection.25 When faced with
254. In re Petition of C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
255. See supra Part II.B.
256. See Developments in the Law -Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: VI. Battered
Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1597 n.5 (1993).
257. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2005).
258. In some instances, the parent raising the sexual orientation issue may do so merely
as a tactic in the custody litigation and not because he or she is truly concerned with the
well-being of the child. See, e.g., Downey v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that the licensed clinical social worker who conducted a custody evaluation
testified that the mother's homosexuality "was not a primary focus for [the father] during
the evaluation").
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particularly vehement objections to a parent's sexual minority orien-
tation, the court should consider appointing an expert to determine
if the homophobia qualifies as parental alienation. The court should
also require direct evidence that the requested restrictions on a
sexual minority parent relate to an articulable harm and not to the
child's general reactions to the divorce and the dissolution of the
family.259 A Washington court exemplifies this approach, stating that
the "evidence showed only that the children experienced difficulty ad-
justing after their parents' separation. But where the only harm is
adjustment, the remedy is counseling, not restrictions on the parents'
lifestyle in terms of sexual orientation. 26 °
When a parent seeks a modification of custody or visitation based
on sexual orientation, either by requesting custody or seeking re-
strictions on the sexual minority parent, the request may be prompted
by the other parent learning that the sexual minority parent is dat-
ing or living with another person. The fact that a parent has formed
a new romantic relationship, however, is not sufficient to warrant a
material change in circumstances.26' Much more is required, as was
articulated in Damron v. Damron, where the North Dakota Supreme
Court recognized "a doctrinal aversion to changing the custody of a
happy child who has been living with one parent," noting that the
burden on the parent seeking a change is "daunting" and "arduous."'262
The court then listed numerous cases that rejected the presumption
of harm simply because children were living in a sexual minority
household.26
In addition, courts should require a showing of a direct relation-
ship between difficulties a child may experience with any restric-
tions imposed on a parent. This connection between harm to the child
and restrictions on the parent is comparable to the "nexus" approach
required by some courts.264 Judges, however, should be wary not to
259. Some courts require very little evidence to support the claim that a parent's sexual
orientation has an adverse impact on the child. See, e.g., Layne v. Layne, No. CA20001-01-
001, 2001 WL 1359784, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2001) (merely finding that the child
was "upset" by his mother's relationship with another woman was sufficient evidence);
Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898,904-05 (N.C. 1998) (the trial court found that it was not
in the best interests of the children to reside under the same roof with any person with
whom the father was having a homosexual relationship based on evidence that one of the
children became visibly upset and began to cry when the father told the child that he was
gay. The mother obtained a change in custody, even though the children were well-
adjusted, attended school regularly, and made good grades).
260. In re Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652, 653 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
261. See, e.g., Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 2003).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 875.
264. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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falsely attribute a child's emotional distress in reaction to his or her
parents' separation to turmoil over the sexual minority parent's sexual
orientation. The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Blew v. Verta pro-
vides an example of reversing court-imposed parenting restrictions
when there is no such causal connection, noting that "[t]here is simply
no evidence in the record of a causal link between the mother's homo-
sexuality and [the child's] acting-out behavior." '265
Although some courts in the custody and visitation cases make
statements such as, "a parent's unmarried cohabitation with a ro-
mantic partner ... in the presence of a child cannot be abided," '266
adoption courts typically do not mask the sexual orientation issue by
raising concerns that the same-gender petitioners are living in a non-
marital sexual relationship.267 Furthermore, any assurances by the
custody or visitation courts that the negative implications that result
from "non-marital" cohabitation apply equally to heterosexual and
homosexual parents ignores the obvious: same-gender couples cannot
marry in that court's jurisdiction, so there can never be "equal" appli-
cation of this factor.268 Instead of passing moral judgments on parents,
the court should follow the inquiry of the adoption cases and look at
the nature of the parent-child relationship to determine the best in-
terests of the child.269 In addition, normal displays of affection, such
as hand holding, kissing, and hugging should not be equated with
"sexual conduct" more often when performed by parents in same-
gender relationships than when they are performed by parents in a
relationship with a person of the opposite gender.27 °
An example of applying the best interests of the child standard
instead of applying the judge's or other parent's moral judgments is the
265. 617 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
266. Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Ark. 2003).
267. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320-21 (Mass. 1993). It is precisely
because the couple cannot marry that the courts find that the adoption is in the best
interests of the child, so that the child's relationship with both parents will be protected.
In Adoption of Tammy, the court notes that "Helen and Susan, recognizing that the
laws of the Commonwealth do not permit them to enter into a legally cognizable marriage,
believe that the best interests of Tammy require legal recognition of her identical emo-
tional relationship to both women." Id. at 316.
268. See Matt Larsen, Note, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay Parents'
Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 53
(2004) for an analysis of how the use of sexual orientation in child custody and visitation
cases violates sexual minority parents' constitutional rights.
269. See Bruce D. Gill, Comment, Best Interests of the Child? A Critique of Judicially
Sanctioned Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 TENN. L. REV.
361 (2001).
270. See Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 666 (1996).
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case of Downey v. Muffley.27' In that case, the Indiana Court of Appeals
found the visitation restriction imposed by the trial court, which
prohibited both parents from having a romantic partner spend the
night with them while the child is in his or her care, could be justified
"only when it is based upon a finding of harm to the children on a case-
by-case basis. Visitation and custody determinations must be de-
termined with respect to the best interests of the children, not the
sexual [orientation] of the parents." '272 The appellate court noted that
the licensed clinical social worker who completed the custody evalu-
ation for the family, "concluded that [the] Mother should be allowed to
be in a 'committed relationship,' which 'would also be in the best inter-
ests of the children.' There was no evidence presented that [the] Mother
was promiscuous or involved in 'revolving door' relationships." '273
In the Downey case the appellate court required evidence of actual
harm to the children before the trial court could impose a restriction
on a parent.274 In other words, the parent seeking the restriction had
the burden of producing evidence that the children were being harmed
by the mother's partner spending the night. This position prevents
the court from presuming that a parent who is living openly as sexual
minority will cause harm to the child in the future, a presumption
that once in place is difficult for the sexual minority parent to rebut.
A 1979 decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey provides
an excellent example of a court refusing to accept the argument that
children might suffer harm if they continue in their sexual minority
parent's custody because of "the thinking of the vast majority of
society" about homosexuality. 5 In MP. v. S.P., the court notes:
If defendant retains custody, it may be that because the
community is intolerant of her differences these girls may some-
times have to bear themselves with greater than ordinary fortitude.
But this does not necessarily portend that their moral welfare
or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to expect that
they will emerge better equipped to search out their own stan-
dards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the major-
ity is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better able
to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to the
requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the constraints
of currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
271. 767 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
272. Id. at 1020-21 (emphasis in original).
273. Id. at 1021 (citation omitted).
274. Id.
275. M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
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Taking the children from the defendant can be done only at
the cost of sacrificing those very qualities they will find most sus-
taining in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead. Instead of
forbearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will foster in them a
sense of shame for their mother. Instead of courage and the precept
that people of integrity do not shrink from bigots, it counsels the
easy option of shirking difficult problems and following the course
of expedience. Lastly, it diminishes their regard for the rule of
human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those
to whom we are indebted for love and nurture merely because
they are held in low esteem by others.276
Not only does this opinion turn a perceived harm into a positive
factor, it also supports the findings of social science research: it is
the nature of the parent-child relationship that matters in predict-
ing good outcomes for children, not a parent's sexual orientation.
277
CONCLUSION
To promote healthy psychological outcomes for children who are
the subject of custody or visitation litigation involving a sexual minor-
ity parent, trial courts should reject the temptation presented by the
heterosexual parent to accept stereotypical and unsubstantiated fears
about homosexuals. The trial court should instead follow the model
of the majority of the other sexual minority parenting cases, such as
the same-gender marriage, foster care, and adoption cases, which
accept the substantial research that sexual orientation is not a rele-
vant factor in predicting successful mental and physical development
for children. In particular, the court should refuse to impose a closet
on the parent as a condition for continued contact with the children
but rather should adopt the presumptions of most of the adoption
cases: sexual minority parents, who are open about their sexual orien-
tation are raising happy, healthy, and well-adjusted children. If courts
were to treat sexual orientation as a neutral factor, as is done in these
adoption cases, then they could properly focus on assessing each
parent's child-raising abilities, investigating the nature of the parent-
child relationship, and preserving the emotional attachment of the
children to their parents. It is these factors, not a parent's sexual orien-
tation, that are relevant to determining the true best interests of the
children.
276. Id. at 1263.
277. See COOPER & CATES, supra note 12, at 32.
